Taking the Temperature of Public Opinion: U.S.
Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ciara Watson
M.A. in Political Science
with a Concentration in European Union Policy Studies
James Madison University

Abstract
The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) initiated a military
intervention in 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after years of indecisiveness regarding who was
responsible for intervention and the American public’s opposition to U.S. involvement. The
pattern of U.S. intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was guided by the nature of U.S.
domestic political attitudes. Prior to the breakout of conflict in 1992, the American public was
not primarily concerned with the situation in the former Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The administration of U.S. President George H.W. Bush was selectively
engaged in the situation in Bosnia and preferred to defer from direct engagement in the initial
months of the conflict. While under the leadership of President Clinton, the United States had a
more engaged approach due to the CNN effect and the drastic shifts in public opinion leading up
to the 1996 presidential election. The paper will analyze the motivation behind the U.S.
intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We will assess the geostrategic and moral
considerations of the United States relative to American public opinion during that time. In order
to analyze the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we will continue to discuss the historical events
and how public opinion shifted as a result of these events. I will conclude by discussing the
public opinion trends and the political rationale for intervention that was ultimately driven by
concerns over the upcoming presidential election.
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Introduction
The dissolution of Yugoslavia sparked a wave of humanitarian and military intervention
in the region that served as a turning point in international relations. Throughout the mid-1990s,
the conflicts in the Balkans shifted international and American public opinion which redefined
America’s role in Europe. The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) initiated a military intervention in 1995, after years of indecisiveness regarding who
was responsible for intervention and the American public’s opposition to U.S. involvement.
Following the Holbrooke mission in the summer of 1995, U.S. diplomacy in the Balkans was
structured on multidimensional stability and activism. The choice of the Clinton administration
to intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina posed many questions on the domestic front within U.S.
media and domestic public opinion. Following the Vietnam War, many Americans questioned
and criticized the United States’s involvement in a geographical region where intervention was
not abundantly popular on the home front. However, the interest in the Western Balkans resulted
from humanitarian and moral considerations and the desire of the United States to facilitate
democratization within the region.
The paper will illustrate the timeline of historical events leading up to U.S. involvement
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and discuss the explanations and motivations of the United States
intervention. It will assess the level of public support regarding whose responsibility it was to
take action to stabilize the region, and support for air strikes, the implementation of the no-fly
zone, and the favorability of military action. Finally, it will address the shift in public perception
of presidential handling of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and conclude how the polling
data contributed to the actions of the United States government in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Literature Review
CNN Effect
The phases of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War Western Balkans were spread
over two presidential administrations and divided into three phases: (1) an initial reluctance to
interfere in a primarily European problem, (2) an attempt at diplomacy and (3) armed military
intervention (Klemenčič, 2013). Scholars have asserted that there are two main factors that
fueled U.S. motivation for intervention in the 1990s included: (1) the CNN effect, and (2) the
moral indignation of the presidential administration, as both of these factors impact public
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support for foreign interventions. The media “strongly influences public perceptions of
contemporary political issues and may raise the salience of some issues over others” (Carey,
2001, 73). The CNN effect is the concept that violent or emotional imagery that is depicted on
daily news in regard to international conflict sparks moral outrage. This outrage then translates to
political pressure and a rise in political discourse whereby public support for humanitarian
intervention rises (Western, 2002, 1).
Television indirectly influences political agendas where foreign interventions are
concerned. The amount of television coverage during the intervention in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (in addition to interventions in Kosovo and Haiti) were tremendous and constituted
the number one foreign policy story in the U.S. media throughout the Clinton presidency (Carey,
2001, 74). The moral indignation of the presidential administration related to the feelings of
moral responsibility of the American administration to stop international human rights violations
against the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. The constant depiction of news footage that streamed
into the average American’s home helped to exaggerate the scheme of the events in Bosnia, and
“contributed to a public consensus for action” (Carey, 2001, 74). Three years leading up to the
intervention in Bosnia, television coverage highlighted the power behind depicting the atrocities
occurring in Serb concentration camps. The use of media in this regard fueled American public
opinion more fervently than the killings of Bosnian Muslims from 1991-93, “which hardly
caught the attention of the U.S. public, in part because most of it had taken place in remote
villages out of a camera’s eye” (Carey, 2001, 74). The spread of information and visual evidence
of the atrocities that occurred affected public opinion in such a way that directly impacted the
Clinton administration’s decision to intervene and to exhibit a strong foreign policy approach for
moral and political purposes.

The Presidency and Public Opinion
During the end of the George H.W. Bush presidency, “in May 1992, 55% of those polled
opposed U.S. air strikes against the Serbs, and 61% of women (the base of swing votes) opposed
them” (Carey, 2001, 75). After this, public opinion on airstrikes declined, until the emergence of
news regarding ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims that occurred in the following month.
By August 1992, 53% of registered voters favored U.S. participation in a UN-authorized
intervention involving air strikes or ground troops” (Carey, 2001, 75). The then Presidential
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candidate, Clinton, harshly criticized President Bush’s policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina for
choosing to stay out of the conflict, but public opinion on U.S. intervention during the first year
of the Clinton presidency declined for several months.
In 1994, President Clinton’s approval ratings dropped significantly, and the
administration was concerned over the perception of incompetency in President Clinton’s
policies in the Western Balkans. On the domestic front, the public was generally satisfied with
his presidency, but “the constant images of killings, and U.S. inaction, contributed heavily to low
public perceptions of his performance as president” (Carey, 2002, 75). President Clinton catered
to the results of public opinion polls in the years leading up to his reelection campaign to assess
the public’s view on how he was simultaneously handling multiple international crises. The
motivation behind his actions during the war relates to public opinion and is reflected through
polling approval rating data and their actions in foreign interventions. The variability of
Clinton’s position on the use of militarized force in Bosnia were in alignment in the gaps in
public opinion polls during this time “Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke argued
that the situation in Bosnia had put President Clinton’s reelection at risk and that decisive action
was needed to resolve the conflict (Carey, 2001, 75). President Clinton and his cabinet felt that
the only way to solve the Bosnia crisis and improve the chance of reelection would be to take
decisive action and “to send a signal that the United States was seriously committed to forcing a
negotiated solution” (Carey, 2001, 75). The American public was primarily concerned with the
intervention but cared about limiting U.S. casualties and successfully achieving the foreign
policy objectives of the United States. This subsequently led to the NATO bombings that
coerced peace negotiations among the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats in 1995. Ultimately,
the Dayton Peace agreement was viewed as one of President Clinton’s greatest achievements in
foreign policy during his two-term presidency.
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Methodological Approach
Research Question
What was the motivation behind U.S.-led intervention and engagement in Bosnia and
Herzegovina?
Hypothesis
The rationale for conventional intervention in the 1990s were founded upon two
explanations, the CNN Effect, and the morality behind intervention. Each of these explanations
have an effect on public opinion which was one of the main drivers of action regarding
international intervention in Bosnia. Therefore, if public opinion shifts in support of certain
actions regarding the intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina, then action by the Clinton
administration during the timeline of the intervention acted in alignment to meet the shift in the
public views.
I will be assessing the considerations of military intervention of the United States relative
to American public opinion during that time. I will be conducting a qualitative analysis in my
comparison of why the United States decided to intervene and the relevant goals of the initiatives
that were considered during U.S. action in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their eventual
disengagement in the region. In order to analyze my case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I will
continue to discuss the actions that were outlined in my literature review and analyze U.S.
presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina relative to public opinion polling data. I will look at polling
data from several American news outlets and polling agencies spanning from 1992 – 1996. I will
be discussing public opinion data on whether the United States and the United Nations had a
responsibility to intervene in the Former Yugoslavia and polling data on whether the U.S. had an
obligation to do more to stop the war in Bosnia. Lastly, I will discuss polling data trends of
support for U.S. military action (with and without European support), the use of a no-fly zone,
and air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. The conflict in Bosnia emerged during the end of the Bush
administration and continued into the second Clinton administration, therefore I will also analyze
the polling data on approval of the U.S. President’s handling of the war in Bosnia.

Relevance
The impact of the United States and NATO allies, on troubled regions of the world has
been substantial in terms of military intervention and humanitarian peacekeeping missions. The
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actions taken by the United States during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina left an
impression on the development and stabilization of the region. The United States was heavily
involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the mid-1990s, and the actions by the U.S.
administration along with its European allies played a role given the views of the American
public and visibility of the events that occurred. The violent events and genocide that occurred
throughout the war played into the resolution of the conflict and the eventual U.S-coordinated
peace agreement.
Continually, the initial reluctance of the U.S. to intervene in Bosnia played a critical role
of the engagement of multilateralism in the conflict within NATO. Multilateral action in Bosnia
did not always go smoothly and was thought to harm the image of President Clinton in the eyes
of Americans and as well as internationally. Overall, the multilateral approach was effective in
stabilizing Bosnia and “the United States was able to link the alliance’s future credibility to
success in Bosnia” (Recchia, 2015, 146).

Timeline Analysis
Phase One: Reluctance to Intervene
At the beginning of the Cold War, conflict arose between the Yugoslavian Communist
Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The leader of Yugoslavia, Josip Tito,
adopted a foreign policy initiative in which he had a non-aligned approach to both the USSR and
the United States for the duration of the Cold War. Until the 1980s, the United States and other
Western democracies supported Yugoslavia economically and politically to serve as an
alternative example of an Eastern European state breaking away from Moscow’s influence
(Boyadjeva, 2002). After the death of Josip Tito in 1980, economic, political and ethnic crisis
overtook Yugoslavia and a sharp rise in nationalism eventually led to the state’s demise. In a
report released by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1990, the agency predicted that
Yugoslavia would cease to function within one year and would most likely dissolve within two
years (Klemenčič, 2013, 1). Overall, Yugoslavia lost its role as a vital partner in the U.S.
political strategy, a position which Belgrade held during the Cold War but actually lost in the
early 1990s when the conflicts began.
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In the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, American law-makers were wary of publically
offering their support for any group involved in the crisis. “The national energy and financial
resources that had been spent on the Gulf Wars in the early 1990s made the United States give up
a decisive role in an intrinsically European problem of the EU member states” (Boyadjeva,
2002). The European Union’s shortcomings in the Balkans raised concern for the development of
a European foreign and security policy. The emergence of military conflict in the Yugoslavian
federation was dealt with by western allies: The United States, France, Germany and the United
Kingdom. This alliance initiated low risk actions such as economic sanctions and the
implementation of an arms embargo by the western nations that were involved at that stage. In
this initial stage, the United States had very little direct involvement in the Balkans. The main
priority of the first Bush administration was to preserve of the integrity of Yugoslavia. The
message given by the administration was that, “the Yugoslavian peoples should solve their
internal problems themselves, but Washington preferred having a united Yugoslavia as a partner
in the international arena” (Boyadjeva, 2002). The United States wanted a united Yugoslavia in
order to have a stable partner. However, the eventual dissolution of Yugoslavia sent the
relationship with the U.S. and the individual Yugoslav states into a state of uncertainty. The
tensions in the region began with the declaration of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and
escalated further on March 1st, 1992, when Muslim Bosniaks and Croats voted for independence
in a referendum, which was heavily boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs.
The patterns of U.S. interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other UN
peacekeeping missions were guided by the nature of U.S. domestic political attitudes. Prior to the
breakout of conflict in 1992, Americans were not concerned with the situation in the former
Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This in part was a result of lack of
media attention at the breakout of the conflict and the lack of public awareness of the conflict.
The administration of U.S. President George H.W. Bush became selectively engaged in Bosnia
but preferred to abstain from direct engagement in the initial violent months of the conflict. The
Bush administration heavily criticized the Serbian leadership in Belgrade for inciting violence in
the region and sought to isolate the regime of Slobodan Milosevic through diplomatic action.
The U.S. administration “nonetheless firmly believed and publicly emphasized that the conflict
was the inevitable consequence of intractable and primordial hatreds unleashed with the collapse
of the communist government's tight control” (Western, 2002). United States foreign policy
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engagement during the early 1990s was to avoid intervening in a situation that would ultimately
lead to a “Vietnam-style quagmire” in the Balkans. On the domestic front, public support was in
line with the administration’s policies on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The public supported the
limited policy initiatives in order to contain the conflict from spreading to areas of geostrategic
interest to the United States--in particular Kosovo, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Turkey, and
Bulgaria (Western, 2002). The relationship between Belgrade and Washington and Moscow
respectively, was significantly stifled during this time. After the fall of communism and violent
ethnic conflicts in the Western Balkans, the media was expected to become active stakeholders
in facilitating democracy by providing a forum for unbiased information to the general public
(Andresen, 2017). The U.S. held this position with the rise in regional tensions in 1991, and only
advocated for a solution through negotiations between the regions, without directly taking sides.

Phase Two: An Attempt at Diplomacy
The Siege of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, began in April of 1992, after the European
Union recognized Bosnia’s independence, which led to Bosnian Serbs laying siege to the city.
Despite the engagement of US representatives and diplomats at various levels and the
Congressional hearings on the need for action in the Balkans in 1992-1993, the U.S. did not
initiate a plan for direct involvement in the conflict. In the meantime, it proved equally difficult
for the European Community to reach a consensus on the breakup of Yugoslavia. The press and
media establishment during the conflicts highlighted the inconsistencies on the perspectives of
France, Great Britain and Germany in regard to how to conflict should be handled. From the
point of view of those that favored a stronger international action, the ineffective initiatives of
the European Community highlighted an even greater need for U.S. and NATO involvement.
In 1992, the UN Security Council outlined resolutions that established a system of
sanctions against Yugoslavia. The U.S. proposed an oil embargo and the freezing of all Yugoslav
assets to the United Nations that year, in which Moscow supported, in addition to other UN
resolutions regarding the conflicts.
In the spring of 1993, the Clinton administration adopted a policy in order to “wait and
see” how the conflict would unfold before the U.S. would pursue direct engagement. After U.S.
President Bill Clinton took office, the U.S. administration made a conscious effort to balance the
U.S. as an international leader on the world stage and the U.S. engagement in peripheral conflicts
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like the ones that were present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, and Haiti (Boyadjeva,
2002). In March 1993, President Clinton declared that the U.S. would support the principles of
multilateralism alongside its NATO allies in the on-going conflicts in the Balkans. This led to the
first multilateral effort of the U.S., Russia, the UK, France and Germany in 1994. The
United States publically advocated for a peaceful solution and worked closely with Russia
because of the links the latter had with the Serbs in Yugoslavia and other historical
considerations (Boyadjeva, 2002).
Later that year, the administration implemented a new approach to contain the conflict in
the Balkans known as the “lift and strike” strategy. It included the lifting of the arms embargo to
Bosnia and Herzegovina thus giving the opportunity to the Bosnian government to defend itself.
Nevertheless, public opinion and international opposition precluded the use of air strikes against
the Bosnian Serbs as retaliation for their aggression. The new strategy went through strict
deliberations and debate within the U.S. Congress and actively promoted U.S. diplomacy.
However, this initiative was disapproved by some Western European allies. While supported by
Germany, it was opposed by France and Great Britain, whose main concern was that the U.S-led
action would spread violence to neighboring areas and the strategy pose risks to the safety of
NATO troops. By contrast, the two European powers were in support of lifting the arms embargo
that was debilitating for the Bosnian Muslims that were less readily armed.
Due to the active opposition of some key NATO allies, the lift and strike policy was
halted. During this stage of the conflict, the goal of Washington was to facilitate a strategy of
containment as an opportunity to end conflict in the territory outside Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The U.S. attempted to lower the level of media attention to the conflict on the domestic news
cycle by sending a small group of troops along with UN forces at the Serbian and Macedonian
border, to symbolize strength and show strong American presence in the region.
The foreign intervention in the Western Balkans caused an increased interest in the role
that American media can play in affecting U.S. involvement in peacemaking and peacebuilding.
In February 1994, the first Markale attack on a market in Sarajevo occurred, in which 68 people
were killed and 144 others were injured. This event led to renewed calls for multilateralism in
the international approach to the Bosnian conflict. “After extensive debates NATO issued an
ultimatum that reflected a compromise between the US and French position thus marking the
return of France to a joint military operation, conducted by NATO” (Boyadjeva 2002). The
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Washington Agreements and the establishment of the Muslim Croat Federation in March 1994
further impacted the progression of the Bosnian Conflict. The United States government
pressured the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to join forces through these agreements. The
Bosnian government “immediately accused Serbian secessionist forces of responsibility and
Western governments and news outlets embraced the story with little or no skepticism”
(Carpenter, 2011). Following the NATO ultimatum, the United States negotiated in order to
facilitate the eventual settlement of the conflict through the implementation of a model that
would halt all military actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deploy UN peacekeeping forces and
force the withdrawal of all heavy weaponry from the area.
American diplomats attempted to convince the Bosnian Muslims that they would not
succeed in their military campaign even if they increased their armament and attempted to attract
more NATO troops. This led to a clear division among NATO allies. France, Germany and
Belgium declared their preparedness for immediate airstrikes, while Great Britain, Spain and
Greece strongly opposed them. The United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was
established in 1992 as an arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for
the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslavian crisis. The role of UN troops was to
ensure that areas designated as “UN Protected Areas” (UNPA) became and “remained
demilitarized and that all persons residing in these areas were protected from fear of armed
attack” (National Defense and the Canadian Armed Forces, 2017). The Commander General for
UNPROFOR, Michael Rose, insisted on reaching a cease fire agreement without issuing
ultimatums that would exacerbate tensions in the region. Meanwhile, German diplomats tried to
push the Croats to give up their claims to certain territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which
led Russia to take the initiative to convince the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the status quo.
As a response to the Markale attacks, a new phase of engagement by the international
community in the conflict occurred, with a heavier involvement of Washington and Moscow.
The United States played a leading role as a mediator between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian
Muslims in government “aimed at the establishment of a federation between the two
communities and an eventual future economic confederation between Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina” (Boyadjeva, 2002). In parallel, Russia asserted its role as the mediator in
negotiations between Bosnian Serbs and other ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
NATO ultimatum and the subsequent diplomatic negotiations represented a turning point of the
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conflict. The U.S. and Russia led the negotiations and became leading international actors in the
peace process, which was previously meant to be handled by EU member states.
The crisis that occurred in February 1994 led international institutions to avoid the option
of military force as a means for solving the conflict. The multilateral actions led to the
Washington Agreement, which established a Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and put an end to the Muslim/Croat conflict. “The agreements although incomplete
undoubtedly added to the prestige of the United States and its right to mediate in the complicated
Balkan affairs” (Boyadjeva, 2002). These actions led to the creation of a Contact Group made up
of conflict mediators from Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.
The Contact Group served as a balance of power structure to attempt to resolve the
conflict. “The talks about finding a solution to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina turned out
to be more of an attempt to regulate the relations between the five powers themselves in the
framework of the new international order rather than finding solutions to the complex
relationships between the various ethnic and historical entities in the region” (Boyadjeva, 2002).
The geostrategic interests of the United States and Western European countries were based upon
the power position of the American hegemon and the United States’ determination for how
intervention is framed and conducted.
In the Spring of 1994, the Clinton administration was criticized for its policies in Bosnia
among members of Congress. Prominent representatives considered the strategies in Bosnia as
too collaborative with Russia and raised concerns on the inclusion of Russian troops within
UNPROFOR. The White House defended its positions by reiterating that Russian involvement
during this Bosnian crisis was an effective strategy and an indispensable collaborative measure
after the market attacks in Sarajevo earlier that year, as it led to the NATO ultimatum and events
that followed.

Phase Three: Armed Military Intervention
In April 1994, after the bombing against the Muslim enclave in Gorazhde, the
international community began a more active approach to engagement in the Bosnian conflict.
International actors had the upper hand engagement in the Balkans because they had the ability
to threaten the use of air strikes. However, the use of these threats placed a rift between the
countries that participated in the Contact Group. The threats put the interests of the United
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Kingdom and France against the views of the United States on how to approach direct
militarized engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Clinton administration refused to allow
U.S. troops to be deployed to the area and attempted to secure diplomatic and military support
for the reimplementation of the lift and strike policy, which would lift the arms embargo and
then order air strikes. Subsequently, two American fighter bombers under NATO command
bombed Serbian targets near Gorazhde, marking the first time that NATO warplane had been
used to attack Serbian ground positions during the Bosnian conflict (Sudetic, 1994). The
American media claimed that the U.S. and its NATO allies had taken all necessary measures to
resume negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, and that “force was the only existing argument that
the Bosnian Serb soldiers understood” (Boyadjeva, 2002). Following the air strikes, U.S.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher publicly expressed his optimism for the possibility of a
ceasefire agreement.
President Clinton announced to the public that the attack was in line with UN resolutions
and demonstrated “the will of NATO and the will of the United Nations” as a function of
UNPROFOR operations (Boyadjeva, 2002). President Clinton’s intention was to send a message
to the Bosnian Serbs to withdraw from Gorazhde and restart the negotiation process. The
airstrikes presented a threat to the newly achieved concurrence of action between the U.S. and
Russia.
After the situation in Gorazhde worsened, the US and NATO Secretary General Manfred
Wörner called for additional airstrikes to prevent more attacks by the Bosnian Serbs. However,
British diplomats categorically opposed the U.S. call for additional airstrikes citing that it was
incompatible with UNPROFOR’s mandate. President Clinton had considerable freedom to act on
the aggression of Bosnian Serbs by stating that they would not be allowed to continue their
aggressions with impunity (Robbins and Rogers, 1999). The subsequent compromise was that
NATO would begin immediate airstrikes if the Bosnian Serbs did not comply with the following
criteria: (1) immediate halt of their air strikes, (2) withdrawal of troops within 3 kilometers from
the center of Gorazhde, and the withdrawal of all heavy armory to an area 20 kilometers away
from Gorazhde (Boyadjeva 2002). The Gorazhde crisis was a serious threat to joint actions of
allies within NATO. “The United Kingdom and France warned that the continuing deployment
of the lift and strike policy would lead to a withdrawal of their respected military units of ground
forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Boyadjeva 2002). While the crisis in Gorazhde ended in
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April, it brought up issues of disagreement among NATO allies and put a rift between Russia
and the United States within the context of the United Nations. Through the work of the Contact
Group, the players involved wanted to make gains in ending the hostility in Bosnia within four
months. The breakthrough in multilateral action in Bosnia did not occur until the following year,
and “for more than two years, the US involvement there passed under the motto that it was not in
the interest of the United States to interfere militarily and what it needed was protection of the
humanitarian missions and UN peacekeeping forces” (Boyadjeva, 2002. 15).
In July 1995, Serb forces laid siege to the enclave in Srebrenica and slayed upwards of
7,000 Bosnian men and boys, expelling thousands more in one of the largest mass movements
caused by ethnic cleansing. The Clinton administration previously held hesitations to act beyond
the “lowest common multilateral” level which encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to react,
culminating in the massacre (Recchia, 2015, 114). The inconsistency of the Clinton
administration was progressively becoming a political liability after the Srebrenica massacre.
“The events at Srebrenica in July 1995 provoked further condemnation of Clinton’s exceedingly
timid approach in U.S. and international media” (Power, 2004, 430). After the massacre, U.S.
diplomat Richard Holbrooke, and U.S Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright,
initiated an effort to persuade officials in the Pentagon to push for “using military pressure to
compel the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a suitable peace settlement” (Recchia, 2015, 133). This
led to significant disagreement among NATO allies on whether to initiate an active bombing
campaign, until August 28, 1995 when a second attack occurred in a Sarajevo marketplace,
which led France, Great Britain, Germany and the United States to call for NATO air strikes.
The Clinton administration, which was in favor of intervention, began to see the air strike
campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, as imminent: “President Clinton himself reportedly
insisted, referring to the Bosnian Serbs, “we have to hit ‘em hard” (Recchia, 2015, 134).
On October 12, 1995, a formal ceasefire took effect in Bosnia. The ceasefire agreement
was a part of a U.S. led effort to broker peace and stability in the region. In the hours leading up
to the truce, the Serbs were continually moving to expel nearly 20,000 non-Serbs from the
northern region of the country (Associated Press, 1995). The U.S. Defense Department preferred
that the U.S. “hold its nose and accept most Serb territorial gains while at the same time seeking
to persuade the Bosnian Muslims to sign a permanent cease-fire” (Recchia, 2015, 120). The U.S.
effort to stabilize Bosnia and end the conflict was viewed differently among the American
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people. Those that wanted the U.S. to intervene to put an end to the conflicts felt that U.S.
involvement, whether multilateral or unilateral, was the best course of action.
On November 21st, 1995 after three weeks of negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of
Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia formulated a peace agreement which was signed in Paris a month
later. The Pentagon and the U.S. State Department “secured troop contributions from over thirty
NATO and non-NATO countries” (Recchia, 2015, 138). However, while Western Europe was
prepared to increase its own contributions, it was not prepared to do so without the help of the
United States. The U.S. Defense Department conceded that immediate U.S. “withdrawal might
have derailed the entire peace process, the U.S. joint chiefs reluctantly agreed to an extension of
the U.S. deployment, and cooperated in securing congressional funding for the NATO-led
Stabilization Force (SFOR). Overall, the U.S. contributed 8,500 troops to SFOR1. The U.S.
presence slightly decreased in Bosnia until 2004, when a “6,000 strong European Union
peacekeeping force (EUFOR) took over from NATO” in the European Union’s attempt to show
strength in the region and a renewed investment in the Western Balkans.

1The

United States contributed roughly one-third of the total NATO force of roughly 27,000.
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Results
Figure 1: US/UN Responsibility
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American public opinion impacted many components of the decisions taken by President
Clinton in the war. In terms of whose responsibility it was to intervene in Bosnia in an attempt to
put an end of the conflict, at the emergence of the conflict a majority of the American public
viewed military action as a European responsibility. However, the American public’s view on
U.S. responsibility in Bosnia increased from the late months of 1993 and continued into the
spring of 1994. In particular, public perception on U.S. responsibility changed after three
significant events: it increased significantly after the Markale Massacre (February 1994), the
Gorazhde enclave bombing (April 1994), and finally during the Dayton Peace Accord
negotiations (December 1995). Ultimately, a plurality of Americans felt that American
responsibility in the former Yugoslavia and more specifically in Bosnia was founded on the
moral responsibility to stop ethnic cleansing, if Europe itself could not put an end to the conflict
themselves. Each of these events were followed my critical and vocal action from President
Clinton and his administration regarding the multilateral engagement of the U.S. and its allies to
deter the aggression of the Bosnian Serbs. After these violent instances previously mentioned as
well as the successful peace negotiations the American public shifted their views of
responsibility in Bosnia through moral considerations as a result of these instances.
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Figure 2: Favor/Oppose No Fly Zone
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Figure 3: Favor/Oppose U.S. Military Action
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Figure 4: Favor/Oppose Air Strikes
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The level of public support regarding U.S. military action wavered in the first months of
the conflict. When asked whether the U.S. should take military action against the Bosnian Serbs
(Figure 3), support was generally low and increased as President Clinton’s rhetoric became more
critical on the events persisting in Bosnia in April. Overall, the support for the U.S. to act
unilaterally in Bosnia was low; and the American public were only offering their support of
military action if the U.S. acted multilaterally with its European allies.
In terms of early support of intervention in Bosnia (Figure 3), the American public
generally were in support of enforcing the no-fly zone against Serbian aircrafts flying over
Bosnia that was enacted by the United Nations in late 1992 and subsequently implemented in
April of 1993. Public support in favor of the no-fly zone increased incrementally from the time it
was first introduced until the policy was put in place accordingly. The level of public support for
the implementation of the no-fly zone against Serb planes that entered restricted airspace
generally increased between January and April 1993.
The levels of support for NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs aggression (Figure
4) was relatively high in the summer of 1993, but slightly decreased over time. During this
period, President Clinton threatened air strikes and publicly supported NATO airstrikes as a
result of Bosnian Serbs attacking UN Peacekeepers in Sarajevo. As the conflict continued with
the NATO ultimatum on air strikes in February 1994, the breakthrough with the Serbian pullback
contributed to higher support among Americans for multilateral militarized action in Bosnia. The
level of public support for airstrikes in the region did not significantly change between May and
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September of 1993 with a majority of the public being in favor of carrying out airstrike attacks
against the Bosnian Serbs if either UN troops or Bosnian safe havens were targeted.

Figure 5: Presidential Handling
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Given the prevalence of media usage and the CNN effect in Bosnia and Herzegovina
during the war, the American public’s attitudes on how the U.S. President was handling the
situation either unilaterally or through NATO had a role in the decision to engage in military and
humanitarian intervention. At the end of the Bush presidency in 1992, polls showed a majority or
evenly split approval of the president’s handling of Bosnia. However, the public tended to be
more disapproving during periods of inaction by the United States while in Bosnia. This can be
seen throughout the polling data during the summer of 1994. American public opinion shifted
where more Americans approved of President Clinton’s handling when he had a strong stance on
certain events or participated in multilateral action in Bosnia. Public approval increased (and
conversely disapproval dropped significantly) when President Clinton first mentioned
intervening in Bosnia in June of 1993. In February of 1994, after the Markale Massacre and
subsequent statement by President Clinton issuing an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, approval
ratings increased considerably. There was another spike in approval in presidential handling in
June of 1994, and although there was no significant action in this month, this spike was a result
of the foreign policy shift of the Clinton administration after a previous spike in opposing
attitudes in April of 1994. The subsequent trend in positive approval ratings of the president was
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seen in December of 1994, when the Bosnian Serb ceasefire agreement with the Bosnian
Muslims was decided after open peace negotiations held by former President Carter. This ceasefire lasted for roughly four months and prompted hope of further peacemaking negotiations,
which allowed the American public to internalize the actions that were being taken to promote
peace and stability in the region. Ultimately, the presidential approval ratings increased in
January of 1996 after the U.S. agreed to contribute 8,500 troops to SFOR, showing a
commitment to maintaining stability in the region post-Dayton.

Conclusion
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the United States and European allies conducted
humanitarian and military operations that served as a turning point in the ethnic conflicts that
took place in the mid 1990s. The decision of the Clinton administration initiate involvement in
the war in Bosnia posed many questions on the domestic front regarding why the U.S. would
choose to intervene in a region where there was not a clearly defined path to victory. The United
States and other Western allies intervened in the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina to facilitate
stabilization in the region and put an end to violent aggression by the Bosnian Serbs against the
Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Although the United States did not immediately get involved in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, their eventual engagement held a deep impact on the region and the
legacy of the Western Balkans.
The phases of the U.S. involvement in Bosnia spanned over two presidencies with the
initial reluctance to interfere in the Western Balkans due to the fact that the U.S. public viewed
the conflicts as a primarily European problem. This resulted in low public support for
intervention in the first months of the war in Bosnia. The primary factor that deterred the
American public from support for intervention was the ambiguity of unilateral vs. multilateral
action given the other international crises that the U.S. was involved in during the early 1990s.
Both the Bush and Clinton presidencies attempted to achieve their goals through diplomacy but
as the conflict escalated so did the necessity of multilateral military intervention. The
motivations for U.S. involvement is characterized in a linear fashion that begins with the CNN
effect. The CNN effect and the prevalence of media in regard to the Bosnian war was a direct
factor that influenced the levels of public opinion regarding the conflict itself and the handling of
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the situation by President Clinton. The levels of public opinion in favor or against the actions
taken by the United States resulted from the visbility of the war through the media. As events
were bigger and more publicized like a statement given by President Clinton or a high ranking
member of his cabinet that also played into public view on responsibility and presidential
approval. The moral indignation of the Clinton administration also played a role in the rationale
for engagement, as the violent and abhorrent events unfolded in Bosnia, President Clinton
exhibited signs of strength by giving public statements on aggressions by the Bosnian Serbs
which positively affected his approval ratings.
Ultimately, as public opinion shifted, the actions and stance of President Clinton
changed to offset the negative public perception of his foreign policy initiatives in Bosnia.
President Clinton and his cabinet were somewhat obsessed with polling data throughout the
entirety of the Bosnian war because the conflict occurred during a period where polling mattered
significantly leading up to the 1996 presidential election. As Commander in Chief, President
Clinton’s desire to be reelected was a critical factor in how the actions of the United States
unfolded. Therefore, intervention during the war in Bosnia was characterized by the moral
perceptions of the American public which motivated the actions of President Clinton to
peacefully end the conflict for moral reasons (to end the violence and practice of ethnic
cleansing) and for political reasons (to successfully be reelected the following year).
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